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A bstract: This paper presents a case study on the use o f formal methods in specification- 
based, black-box testing o f a smart card applet. The system under test is a 
simple electronic purse application running on a Java Card platform. The 
specification o f the applet is given as a Statechart model, and transformed into 
a functional form to serve as the input for the on-the-fly test generation, 
-execution, and -analysis tool GAST. We show that automated, formal, 
specification-based testing o f smart card applets is o f high value, and that 
errors can be detected using this model-based testing.
Key words: model-based testing; smart cards; Java Card, automatic test generation; 
executable specification.
1 . INTRODUCTION
Smart devices are often used in critical application domains, such as 
electronic banking and identity determination. This implies that their quality, 
such as their safety, security, and interoperability, is very important. Such 
devices commonly implement a Java Card virtaal machine, which is able to 
execute Java Card applets. Each application is then implemented as a 
separate applet.
One way to increase the quality o f applets is the use o f formal methods. 
Such applets are sufficiently small to make a complete formal treatment with 
current day formal technology feasible. Systematic testing is another 
method, predominantly used to check the quality o f smart devices in an 
experimental way.
In this paper we combine testing and formal methods: we test a Java Card 
applet, in a black-box setting, based on a formal specification o f its required 
behavior. Compared with formal verification, testing has the advantage that 
it examines the real, complete system consisting o f applet, platform and 
hardware together, whereas formal verification is usually restricted to a 
model o f the applet only. Compared with traditional, manual testing, formal 
testing has as first advantage that the formality reduces the ambiguities and 
misinterpretations in the specification so that it is dearer what should be 
tested. Secondly, formal specifications allow to completely automate the 
testing process: test cases are algorithmically generated from the formal 
specification, and test results can automatically be analyzed. This makes it 
possible to generate and execute large quantities o f large tests in a short 
time. It is m anly  this second advantage that we will pursue in this paper.
Our investigation o f formal testing is conduced using a case s td y . The 
applet that we test is a simple electronic purse application, implemented as a 
Java Card applet, with a limited set o f methods like asking the v a le  on the 
card, debiting, crediting, etc. The formal specification o f the electronic purse 
applet is given as a Statechart1. The case and its formal specification are 
described in Section 2.
Automatic test generation, test execution, and test result analysis are 
performed in an on-the-fly fashion, using the test tool GAST2. The test tool 
GAST is described in Section 3. Section 4 describes how the Statechart 
specification is transformed into Clean3, a functional programming language 
used as the input language for GAST. How GAST, the applet under test, and 
the platform are connected is described in the test architecture, which is 
given in Section 5.
We constructed one (assumed to be) correct applet implementation. From 
this implementation we derived 22 mutants by inserting subtle bugs to see 
whether such bugs would be detected by our automated, formal testing 
method. A summary o f the performed tests is given in Section 6. Finally, 
Section 7 and 8 discuss related work, conclusions, and possible futare 
extensions.
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2. CASE STUDY
We demonstrate our testing methodology by applying it to a simple 
electronic purse application as a case s td y . The basic events that the 
electronic purse can receive are:
• set an initial v a le  n via se tv a iu e  (n)
• query the a c ta l  v a le  via ge tvaiue  ()
• pay an amount o f n via d eb it(n )
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• authenticate with a p in  (personal identification number) via 
a u th e n tic a te  (pin) before charging the card
• charge the card with an amount o f n via c re d it(n )
• reset the card using a puk (personal unlocking key) via r e s e t  (puk)
All these events are input events for the card, because they are sent from 
the Card Accepting Device (CAD, also called terminal) to the card  To every 
input event, the card answers with a corresponding output event:
• acknowledge an operation via acko k or ack (n)
• report an error v a  e rro r(n )
Figure 1 shows the specification o f the purse, modeled as a Statechart.
setValue(n) [n > MAXVALUE] 
/error(INV_PARAM )
credit(n) [value+n > MAXVALUE] 
/  error(INV_PARAM)
reset(puk) [wrong(puk)] 
/  error(INV_ID)
reset(puk) [ok(puk)] 
/ackO K
getValue()
. /  ack(value)
• ^ d e b it (n )  [value-n >= 0]
/v a lu e  -= n ; ackOK 
debit(n) [value-n < 0]
/  error(INV_PARAM) 
authenticate(pin) [wrong(pin) && tries < 
/tr ie s + + ; error(INV_ID) 
authenticate(pin) [tries >= 5]
/  error(INV_ID) ;
Figure 1. Statechart model o f the purse applet.
The transition labels between two states s1 and s2 are o f the form:
with i being an input event, g  being a guard, and act representing a 
sequence o f actions. We exemplify the semantics with this transition:
a  , , i  cre d it(n )\n <  M A X V A L U E —v a lu e !/va lu e+ = n :tn e s:= 0 :a ckO K  . t  t  7Autenticated ------------ — ---------------------------------- —----------------------------------------> Initialised
The input event (i) is c re d i t  (n ). The argument n represents the amount 
o f money to be added to the card  The applet uses signed 16-bit integer 
sh o rts  and it gives an e r ro r  ( in v _ pa r a m ) on negative values. We abstract 
from that in the Statechart to keep it concise The actual value o f the card is 
saved in the variable value. A transition can only fire when the 
corresponding guard g  holds. In this example, one can only increase the 
value o f the card by n, when n does not exceed the MAxvALUE-vaiue. If the 
transition is taken, the actions act are performed In this case, the variable
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value is incremented by n, the t r i e s  variable is reset to zero, and the 
acknowledgment ackOK is sent to the terminal.
Intuitively, the purse works as follows. At first, the card is in the 
U n in i t ia l iz e d  state. It is initialized by the credit institution, which issues 
the card to the customer by putting a certain amount n o f money on it via the 
setV alue(n) event.
In the i n i t i a l i z e d  state the customer can query the actual value via the 
getvaiue  () event, or pay with the card via the d e b it  (n) event. To increase 
the value, one must first authenticate at a terminal with a card-specific pin, 
leading to the A u then tica ted  state. Being in that state, one can add money 
via the c re d i t  (n) event, leading back to the i n i t i a l i z e d  state. The card 
checks that its value does not exceed the m a x v a l u e .
Furthermore, there is a maximum of five tries to enter the pin. After the 
fifth wrong attempt, one can no longer credit the card  If the credit institution 
enters the reset code (called puk) correctly, the card goes back to the 
U n in i t ia l iz e d  state and can be re-initialized via the se tv a lu e  (n) event. If 
the puk is entered wrongly, the card goes to the in v a lid  state and cannot be 
used anymore
Two kinds o f erroneous events can be sent to the card  Firstly, a 
syntactically correct input event that is not specified for the actual state may 
occur, eg ., a c re d i t  (n) when the card is in the i n i t i a l i z e d  state. Such an 
unspecified input event is called an inopportune event, and the response of 
the applet should be an error message error(iNv_cMD), whereas the applet 
rem ans in its actual state. Secondly, a syntactically incorrect event may 
occur, eg ., a command-APDU with a non-existing event-code This is also 
implicitly assumed to lead to an error message, while the card stays in its 
current state.
3. THE TEST TOOL GAST IN A NUTSHELL
The test tool GAST is designed to be open and extendable For this 
reason it is implemented as a library rather than a standalone tool. The 
functional programming language Clean is chosen as host language due to its 
expressiveness.
GAST can handle two kinds o f properties. It can test properties stated in 
logic about (combinations of) functions. GAST can also test the behavior of 
reactive systems based on Extended (Finite) State Machines, E(F)SM. Here 
we will only discuss the ability to test reactive systems.
An ESM as used by GAST comes quite dose to the Statechart o f Figure 
1. It consists o f states with labelled transitions between them. A transition is 
o f the form ƒ — 1,0 > t , where s, t are states, i is an input which triggers the
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transition, and o is a, possibly empty, list o f outputs. The domains o f the 
inputs, outputs, and states can be given by arbitrarily complex recursive 
Algebraic Data Types (ADT). This constitutes the m an  difference with 
traditional testing with FSM's where the testing algorithms can only handle 
finite domains and deterministic systems4.
A transition ƒ — ‘/o > t  is represented by the ta p e  (s, i, t, o). A relation 
based specification 5r is a set o f these tapes: 5r c  S x I x S x O  . The 
transition function 5f is defined by 5f(s,i) = { (t, o) | (s, i, t , o ) e 5 r }. Hence, 
ƒ — —0 > t  is equivalent to (t, o) e 5f(s,i). A specification is partial H for 
some state s and input i we have 5f (s, i) = 0 ,  otherwise it is total. A 
specification is deterministic H for all states and inputs the size o f the set of 
targets contains at most one dement: D Sf (s, i) < 1. A trace c  is a sequence of 
inputs and associated outputs from a given state. Traces are defined 
inductively: the empty trace connects a state to itself ƒ — ^—  ƒ . We can 
combine a trace ƒ — c—  t  and a transition t  — —0 > u form the target state t, 
to trace ƒ — —/o > t . We define ƒ — 1,0 > = 3 t .ƒ — ‘/o > t  and 
ƒ — c—  = 3 t .ƒ — —^ t . All traces from state s are: traces(s) = 
{1 | ƒ — —^  }. The inputs allowed in state s are given by init(s) = 
{ i | 3o^ — —— }. The states after trace t  in state s are given by s after t  = 
{1 1 ƒ — —^  t }. We overload traces, init, and after for sets o f states instead 
o f a single state by taking the union o f the individual results. When the 
transition function, 5f, to be used is not clear from the context, we will add it 
as subscript.
The basic assumption for our formal testing is that the Implementation 
Under Test, iut, is also a state machine. Since we do black box testing, the 
state o f the iut is invisible. The iut is assumed to be total: any input can be 
applied in any state. Conformance o f the iut to the specification spec is 
defined as (s0 is the initial state o f spec, and t0 o f iut):
i u tconf sp e c  =  V c  e tmceƒspec( 0) , V i e i f t ( 0afterspecc ) , V o e  O *
( t 0 afteriut C ) — — ^  ( 0 afterspec C ) — —
Intuitively: H the specification allows input i after trace t ,  the observed 
output o f the iut should be allowed by the specification. If spec does not 
specify a transition for the current state and input, anyhing is allowed. This 
notion o f conformance is very similar to the ioco relation5 for Labeled 
Transition Systems (LTS). In an LTS each input and output is modeled by a 
separate transition. In our approach an input and all induced outputs up to 
quiescence are modeled by a single transition. Quiescence characterizes a 
state o f the iut that will not produce any output before a new input is 
provided, i.e. a quiescent system waits for input and cannot do anyhing else.
In order to test conformance, a collection o f input sequences is needed. 
At the beginning o f each input sequence GAST resets the iut and the spec to 
their initial state. By applying the inputs o f a sequence one by one, GAST 
investigates if  it can be transformed to a trace o f spec. The previous inputs 
and observed responses are remembered in trace t .  If 5spec(s, i) ^  0  for the 
current input i and some state s reachable from the initial state, S0, by trace t  
(i.e. ƒ0 — ——• ƒ), the input is applied to the iut, and the observed output is 
checked to be allowed by spec.
GAST has several algorithms for input generation, e.g.:
• Systematic generation o f sequences based on the input type.
• Sequences that cover all transitions in a finite  state machine.
• Pseudo random walk through the transitions o f a specification.
• User defined sequences.
In this paper we will only use the third algorithm to generate input 
sequences. Testing is on-the-fly, which means that input generation, 
execution, and result analysis are performed in lockstep, so that only the 
inputs actaally needed will be generated. The lazy eva la tion  o f Clean used 
for the implementation o f GAST makes this easy.
Within the test tool GAST, the mathematical state transition function, Sf, 
specifying the desired behavior is represented by a function in the functional 
programming language Clean. Functional languages allow very concise 
representations o f specifying functions and have well understood semantics. 
Using an existing language as notation for the specification prevents the 
need to design, implement and learn a new language. The rich data types and 
available libraries enable compact and elegant specifications. The advanced 
type system of functional languages enforces consistency constraints on the 
specification, and hence prevents inconsistencies in the specification.
Since the specification is a function in a functional programming 
language, it can be executed. This is convenient when one wants to validate 
the specification by observation o f its behavior.
Any Clean type can be used to model lhe state, the input and the output 
o f the function specifying Sf, in c ld in g  user-defined data types. GAST uses 
generic programming techniques for generating, comparing, and printing of 
these types. This implies that default implementation o f these operations can 
be derived without any effort for the test engineer. Whenever desired, these 
operations can be tailored using the full power o f the functional 
programming language.
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4. THE PURSE SPECIFICATION FOR GAST
The specification given in the Statechari is transformed to the functional 
language Clean in order to let GAST execute and manipulate it. This section 
gives some details about the representation in Clean o f the electronic purse 
from Figure 1. Due to space limitations we will only show snapshots o f the 
(executable) specification. A parameterized enumeration type represents the 
state o f the purse
: :  P u r s e S ta te  = U n i n i t i a l i z e d  | I n i t i a l i z e d  S h o r t S h o rt 
I A u th e n t ic a te d  S h o r t | I n v a l id
We use one constructor for each state from the Statechari in Figure 1. 
The arguments o f the constructor I n i t i a l i z e d  represent the tries counter 
and the v a le .  The type sh o rt represents signed 16-bit integers. This implies 
that there are actaally 216 x 216 = 232 different i n i t i a l i z e d  states, o f which 
some are not reachable. There are similar types for input and output.
A transition function purse, similar to Sf, in Section 3 models the 
transitions. The only difference with the mathematical specification is that 
the result is a list o f ta p e s  instead o f a set o f tap es . Some function 
alternatives specifying characteristic transitions are:
p u rs e  : :  P u r s e S ta te  P u rs e ln p u t  -5  [ ( P u r s e S ta te ,  [P u r s e O u tp u t] )] 
p u rs e  U n i n i t i a l i z e d  (S e tV a lu e  n)
= i f  (n >= 0 && n <= MAXVALUE)
th e n  [ ( I n i t i a l i z e d  0 n, [AckOK])] 
e l s e  [ ( U n i n i t i a l i z e d ,  [E r ro r  INV_PARAM])] 
p u rs e  ( I n i t i a l i z e d  t r i e s  v a lu e )  R ese t 
= [ ( U n i n i t i a l i z e d ,  [AckOK])] 
p u rs e  ( I n i t i a l i z e d  t r i e s  v a lu e )  G etV alue
= [ ( I n i t i a l i z e d  t r i e s  v a lu e ,  [Ack v a l u e ] )]
p u rs e  s t a t e  any = [ ( s t a t e ,  [E r ro r  INV_CMD])]
The first alternative models both transitions for the input SetValue n 
from the state U n in itia l iz e d . The second and third alternative show two 
transitions form the state I n i t i a l i z e d .  The last alternative captares the 
informal requirement that inopportane events should cause no state transition 
and an error message as output. Since s t a t e  and input any are variables, this 
alternative covers any combination not listed above. Since exactly one 
transition is defined for each combination o f state and input, the 
specification is total and deterministic.
This specification is an ordinary definition in the functional programming 
language Clean. It is checked by the compiler before it is used by GAST. 
This guarantees well-defined identifiers and type correctness.
5. TESTING JAVA CARDS WITH GAST
The tests, which +11 be described in Section 6, have been executed using 
the test architecture o f Figure 2.
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CREF-
IUT
Java Card Applet
Virtual Machine
ISO 7816
TLP 224
Specification
GAST
Data Data
Generation Analysis
-------\ APDUs I--------------»
------- -|TLP PDUs|--------------»
Adapter
ISO 7816
TLP 224
TC P /IP
Figure 2. The general testing framework.
The IUT is the Java Card applet implementing our simple electronic 
purse. To make testing easier and more flexible, we used a simulation 
platform to execute the applet. The simulation environment is the C- 
language Java Card Runtime Environment (CREF), which comes with the 
Java Card Development Kit. CREF simulates a Java Card technology- 
compliant smart card in a card reader. It further consists o f a Java Card 
Virtual Machine, and communication protocol entities to allow 
communication between the applet and the outside world.
To communicate with the applet under test, GAST was enhanced to be 
able to deal with these typical smart card communication protocols ISO- 
7816-4 and TLP-224 over TCP/IP. On top o f these protocol entities an 
adapter (glue code), was implemented. The adapter transforms the high level 
inputs, generated by GAST, and represented as Clean data v a le s , into the 
low-level APDUs, coded as appropriate b y e  codes, and then sent according 
to the ISO-7816-4 protocol. Vice versa, the adapter decodes the APDUs 
received from the applet under test to Clean data v a le s , which are then 
analyzed and checked by GAST.
For data generation and anatysis GAST uses the Clean EFSM 
specification, which was developed in Section 4. Except for the access to 
TCP/IP, the right-hand side o f Figure 2 was entirety implemented in Clean.
The use o f a simulation platform for testing is not a restriction with 
respect to testing o f real smart cards. Since onty standardized protocols are 
used, GAST cannot see the difference between testing on a simulator, and 
testing a real smart card. The test architecture could easity be adapted to test
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real cards by swapping CREF with a real card and its reader. The use o f a 
simulation platform does facilitate easy switching between different applets, 
and saving and restoring applet state.
6. RESULTS
The Statechart in Figure 1 and its implementation as an applet were 
developed in an incremental way. GAST appears to spot diiferences between 
the specified and a c ta l  behavior very rapidly. Once the specification and 
implementation were finished, the testing power o f the GAST system was 
determined in a systematic way using mutants. Starting from the ideal 
(assumed to be correct) applet we injected typical programming errors into 
the applet, and analyzed how long it took GAST to find errors by generating, 
executing, and analyzing tests. The mutants are obtained by subtle changes 
like omitting checks or updates to the state o f the applet. The test results for 
the 22 mutants used are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Overview o f  test results.
nr. paths trans­
itions
time
(s)
inputs 
uM l error
comments
1 1 25 0.49 25 6 tries allowed in this mutant
2 2 66 0.09 31 incorrect overflow during c r e d i t
3 1 9 0.47 9 negative balance allowed in mutant
4 5 247 0.71 41 tries not reset after a u t h e n t i c a t e
5 8 406 0.38 51 tries not reset after r e s e t
6 1 1 0.05 1 c r e d i t  allowed without a u t h e n t i c a t e
7 1 1 0.52 1 s e t v a l u e ( O )  not allowed
8 1 4 0.06 4 c r e d i t  with negative amount allowed
9 1 2 0.50 2 d e b i t  with negative amount allowed
10 11 542 0.48 23 no check for locked flag
11 7 327 0.80 26 not locked after 5 attempts
12 1 13 0.06 13 stays authenticated
13 21 1020 1.28 21 not tocked after r e s e t
14 1 16 0.09 16 MAXVALUE too low
15 1 24 0.07 24 a u t h e n t i c a t e  does not authenticate
16 1 33 0.52 33 r e s e t  does not make it uninitialized
17 94 4757 3.82 29 t r i e s  = 5 instead o f t r i e s  < 5
18 4 207 0.26 23 fresh card has nonzero balance
19 1 6 0.30 6 s e t V a l u e  allowed in initial state
20 3 145 0.18 44 s e t V a l u e  does not initialized/unlock
21 1 4 0.50 4 MAXVALUE too high
22 5 206 0.67 2 MAXVALUE balance not allowed
7.8 366.4 0.56 19.5 averages
100 5081 4.20 n/a original applet, no counterexample
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For instance, mutant 17 differs from the ideal applet by testing whether 
the number o f rem aning authentication tries is less than or equal to five 
rather than less than five before setting a flag indicating that the applet 
should no longer accept authentication attempts. This mutant was found after 
executing 94 paths, within 3.82 seconds, containing 4757 transitions in total. 
This mutant showed an invalid output after an input sequence o f lengh  29 in 
path 94. To identify the error, the trace o f inputs and associated responses 
are written to a file.
GAST was able to identify the 22 incorrect implementations without any 
help, using a minimum path lengh  o f 50 transitions and a maximum of 100 
paths. It took an average o f 0.56 seconds to generate and execute, on 
average, 366 transitions on a 1.4GHz Windows computer. Identifying 
incorrect behavior for all 22 mutants cost only 12 seconds in total. This 
shows that GAST is an efficient and effective test tool.
7. RELATED WORK
Two approaches are closely related to ours due to the fact that both rely 
on tools that implement variants o f the ioco testing relation5. Du Bousquet 
and Martin6 use UML specifications, which are translated into Labeled 
Transition Systems to serve as input for the TGV tool7. Instead o f an on-the- 
fly execution, TGV uses additional test purposes to generate test cases. The 
authors created a tool to automate the generation o f test purposes based on 
common testing strategies. The generated test cases are finally translated into 
Java code, which communicates with the applet and executes the test. TGV 
does not treat data symbolically, which can easily lead to a state space 
explosion when dealing with large data domains. Because we generate test 
cases on-the-fly based on the (symbolic) EFSM, this problem does not occur.
To support symbolic treatment o f data, Clarke et al.8 use Input/Output 
Symbolic Transition Systems. The basic approach is similar to TGV, hence 
also here test purposes are needed. The test automation is done via a 
translation to C++ code, which is linked with the implementation. This 
restricts the IUT to be a C++ class with a compatible interface.
Rather than testing properties o f the IUT, its implementation (i.e., the 
Java Card applet) can also be formally verified. Testing and verification are 
complementary techniques to check the correctness o f systems, as explained 
in Section 1. A common technique used for verifying Java Card applets is to 
prove th e i  correctness with respect to a specification in the Java Modeling 
Language (JML). State-based specifications similar to the one in Figure 1 
can uniformly be translated to JML specifications, as shown by Hubbers, 
Oostdijk, and Poll9. The resulting annotated Java Card applet can then be
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verified using one o f the many JML tools10, for instance, the ESCJava2 static 
analyzer11. Most Java Card applets are small enough to even attempt a 
formal correctness-proof using the Loop tool, as demonstrated by Jacobs, 
Oostdijk, and W arnier12.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an approach to automate the testing o f Java Card 
applets using the test tool GAST. The test case derivation is based on a 
Statechart specification o f the applet under test. The specification can 
directly be translated into a corresponding GAST specification. Tests were 
completely automatically derived, executed, and analyzed. Discrepancies 
between the formal specification and its Java Card implementation were 
successfully detected, which shows the feasibility o f this approach.
The direct translation from the Statechart model to the GAST 
specification, and the on-the-fly execution o f the test cases enable the 
developer to start with automatic testing o f the applet in the early stages of 
development. The co-development o f the formal model and the 
implementation, and the facility to do automatic tests, has shown to be very 
useful. Both the code and the specification have evolved simultaneously, 
vastly improving the quality o f the applet, and leading to a complete and 
reliable specification. Such a specification delivers insight on how to specify 
similar cases, and can serve as a pattern for these.
The tested mutants, representing typical programming errors, have 
increased our confidence in the error detecting power o f the GAST 
algorithm. We are panning to compare this with other test tools, e.g., the 
ioco-based tool TorX13, to test more complex applets, testing applets on real 
cards, and testing advanced aspects like the integration, interference, and 
feature interaction between diiferent applets on one card.
Finally, we will compare the testing approach with the formal 
verification approach, e.g., using JML, to see how far we can get in unifying 
verification and testing techniques into one common framework, and to 
investigate the precise shape o f their complementarities.
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